Meggie Macdonald

The Scourge of Rome:  How Hannibal Measures Up to Polybius’ Ideal General

The Second Punic War between Carthage and Rome at the end of the third century BCE left an indelible stamp on the collective consciousness of the Roman people.  After more than fifteen years of war as the Carthaginian general Hannibal laid the Italian peninsula low, Rome had to relearn how to fight and win wars.  Hannibal’s presence so close for so long left a perpetual fear in the minds of the Romans and established him as a specter of hate in literature .  Modern scholarship has continued those traditions by distancing themselves from the emotive reactions to the war and instead choosing to critique the generalship of Hannibal on ‘strategic’ and ‘tactical’ levels.  These are of course anachronisms, for no such concept of professional warfare existed at that time .  Collective and continuous planning of a war was impossible; decisions were always made in the field and at the moment they were needed .  This is not to say that there were never any attempts at long-term planning among the ancient Carthaginians or the Romans but that it was not planning as recognized by modern methods.  Anachronism has led to other confusion in scholarship as well.

Hannibal is perhaps one of the most enigmatic generals in Roman history and no clear, universally-accepted consensus of his abilities exists in current scholarship.  Of course, there need not be only one opinion of the man but the scholarship itself is very polarized and from a variety of different perspectives.  The lack of analytical framework makes a study of Hannibal difficult simply because no scholar has felt restrained by any standardized structure in their critiques.  On the other hand, this restraint was exercised by ancient historians whose works are still extant.  The most complete extant history of the Second Punic War and the historical figures who acted in it is by the Greek Polybius in his Histories.  In his third book, Polybius provides a very concise and potentially very subjective framework for his standards of a good general: 

For there is no denying that he who thinks that there is anything more essential to a general than the knowledge of his opponent’s principles and character, is both ignorant and foolish. For as in combats between man and man and rank and rank, he who means to conquer must observe how best to attain his aim, and what naked or unprotected part of the enemy is visible, so he who is in command must try to see in the enemy’s general not what part of his body is exposed, but what are the weak spots that can be discovered in his mind. For there are many men who, owing to indolence and general inactivity, bring to utter ruin not only the welfare of the state but their private fortunes as well; while there are many others so fond of wine that they cannot even go to sleep without fuddling themselves with drink; and some, owing to their abandonment to venery and the consequent derangement of their minds, have not only ruined their countries their fortunes but brought their lives to a shameful end. But cowardice and stupidity are vices which , disgraceful as they are in private to those who have them, are when found in a general the greatest of public calamities. For not only do they render his army inefficient but often expose those who confide in him to the greatest perils. Rashness on the other hand on his part and undue boldness and blind anger, as well as vaingloriousness and conceit, are easy to be taken advantage of by his enemy and are most dangerous to his friends; for such a general is the easy victim of all manner of plots, ambushes, and cheatery. Therefore the leader who will soonest gain a decisive victory, is he who is able to perceive the faults of others, and to choose that manner and means of attacking the enemy which will take full advantage of the weaknesses of their commander. For just as a ship if deprived of its pilot will fall with its whole crew into the hands of the enemy, so the general who is his opponent’s master in strategy and reasoning may often capture his whole army. [III.81-82]

Polybius very clearly states that the key to being a good general is the ability to understand one’s opponent; in this way, one can predict his actions as they are dictated by his character.  Polybius sees that a bad general can be the destruction of an army while a good general who knows precisely where to strike to achieve victory preserves his army from harm.  Polybius proceeds to outline the importance of ‘knowing thy enemy’ by listing some of the negative traits a general should not possess because they would inhibit this understanding of one’s opponent [III.81.4-9].  The fact that Polybius does not explicitly state the opposite and therefore positive traits a general should have creates a notable ambiguity.  The Greek historian was careful to note that there was more to the actions of a man than the actions themselves; many factors could come into play that would affect or influence his decision-making abilities [IX.22-26]. 

To ‘know thy enemy’, Hannibal makes himself aware of the nature of Roman warfare.  Swift decisive victories are most covetously sought, and Roman commanders, in positions of power oftentimes temporarily, will forge ahead to achieve such ends as quickly as possible.  The Carthaginian general is able to take advantage of this weakness and defeat the Romans in three major battles in Italy.  There is also an historical irony to appreciate here:  Hannibal is accused of youthful impetuosity , but it is the Roman commanders who most often display it in Polybius’ narrative.  Hannibal, despite personality traits that sometimes condemn him in Polybius’ eyes , can be recognized as an effective general based on the framework quoted above.
Just as importantly, the methodology modern scholars use to describe Hannibal’s generalship is also of paramount concern here.  Polybius is rarely read before any scholarly works have been referred to, so modern interpretations colour one’s approach to Polybius.  What is the nature of their perspectives?

Leonard Cottrell observed that most historians admire or idolize Hannibal for the good reason that he had a “right to heroic status” but that his genius may have been evil as was Hitler’s .  He readily admits that he does not have the experience that Polybius considered so vital to a clear understanding of generalship , and although Cottrell is not a soldier himself, he chose to travel to the places in question with his volumes of the Histories .  He also believes that Hannibal would have inspired the same kind of leadership in the 1960s had he been a contemporary of Cottrell.  Cottrell does draw a distinction between the Carthaginian and his nemesis, P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, saying that Scipio was a great “soldier-statesman” but that Hannibal was only a great soldier .

William Harris, in his famous book War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, wrote that Hannibal took advantage of the nature of Rome’s “foreign policy” and left for Italy before the Romans could comfortably deliberate and act .  Erich Gruen also sees actions by Hannibal, particularly at the start of the Second Punic War, as opportunistic.  He observes that Hannibal did not attack Saguntum in Spain until the Romans had become involved in Illyria in the spring of 219 BCE .  According to Gruen’s interpretations of the ‘reluctant Roman empire’ amidst Hellenistic power struggles, Hannibal could thus have been responding to Rome in the manner of a Hellenistic king.  This will be addressed later on within this paper to understand the perspective of Polybius himself as he makes his assertions and judgments.

Nigel Bagnall also believes Polybius’ assertion that Rome waged a defensive war, but does not agree with that argument .  In the Romans, Bagnall sees a “cultural predisposition for war” and believes that “the only destruction which can safely been drawn is that Hannibal was bent on war and Rome was not loath to accept the challenge” .  In regards to Hannibal’s tactics and strengths, he writes that the “potential of the mobile arm was exploited to the full by Hannibal, so enabling the Carthaginians to dominate the open battlefield” .  According to Bagnall, Hannibal’s “strategic objective” was to go to Italy and reduce Rome to a city-state without depending on a fleet, and that “Hannibal’s operational aim was to destroy the Roman army, which he saw as the cohesive force holding the Roman Confederacy together” .  Bagnall’s treatment of Hannibal as a strategic general is much more explicit than much previous scholarship and thus also clearly links his professional tactical judgment with his character.

At the tactical level, Hannibal reorganized the solid formations of his army so as to introduce far greater flexibility.  This enabled him not only to deploy his army so as to make full use of the ground, as at Trasimene, but also to maneuver and encircle an opponent, as at Cannae.  Offensive action and the achievement of surprise, mobility and flexibility leading to encirclement, were Hannibal’s hallmarks .

Hannibal was also mentally and physically robust, imaginative and so innovative, fearless without being foolhardy, unswerving in pursuit of his objective, outstandingly competent professionally through intellectual study and ruthless when necessary .

Bagnall readily agrees to the characterizations of Hannibal by ancient scholars such as Polybius, but he does so in a manner more willingly digested by modern scholars.  Hannibal was ruthless and cruel when he had to be, not because it was an innate part of his character .  Bagnall is also greatly impressed at Hannibal’s tactical skills and exemplifies two of his greatest battles as he describes how the Carthaginian army moved quickly and fluidly to ensure their victories.

One of the world’s greatest scholars on Hannibal and Carthage, Serge Lancel, draws attention to the bias of Livy that Hannibal was a genius but impious, cruel, and pejoratively Carthaginian .  He also explicitly states his interpretation of Polybius’ reflections:  “Polybius’ opinion… is favourable overall, that he most frequently exonerates him of many of the accusations laid against him by Roman historiography…and even that he cannot praise him enough for the specifically military qualities of an army leader” .  Lancel believes that Hannibal’s move into Italy was brilliant since the Romans never suspected it, that he was wise to make arrangements to protect Spain and Africa in 219, and that Hannibal himself changed Roman conceptions of war and the nature of command .

Lancel also adequately outlines the fear Hannibal invoked in the Roman people:  “the memory was still alive of the one enemy who had come within inches of nipping in the bud the greatest undertaking of political and territorial domination the world has ever seen” .  This is the fear that Polybius was so adept at avoiding letting slip into his narrative.  In all honesty, Polybius himself had a different perspective on that fear, not having been a Roman living with the terror of Hannibal in Italy, but he was close enough to members of the Roman aristocracy to observe how closely they held it to their hearts, almost fifty years afterwards.

All these scholars are studying Hannibal in an attempt to reconstruct the historical figure from the surviving texts and other evidence.  But none of them take into account the Polybian interpretation of Hannibal’s actions to discern the literary figure created within the narrative of the Histories.  Arthur Eckstein does look at the Histories in its own right and thus avoids the touchy terminology that plagues most historians.  He outlines the two major aspects of Polybius’ narrative that will be of concern here.  First, that the exact nature of a ‘best policy’ a statesman can engage in is “to maintain as much independence as possible in the face of power” .  However, there is a great deal to consider when trying to understand the natures of these public figures since there is so much that can influence them away from their intended purposes or force them down other avenues that do not reflect the character of the statesman . 

Now, this has strayed from the intended purpose of this paper, but towards a utilitarian result.  The manner in which Polybius outlined his statements about good generalship – that one must be able to see the weaknesses in one’s opponent – and the ambiguities inherent in the actions of statesmen go hand in hand.  Hannibal must have been aware of this veil of ‘truth’  in order to make decisions that Polybius would have appreciated in a positive light. 

Thus, an examination of three of the major battles that take place in Book III of the Histories and the judgments that Polybius makes both for and against Hannibal’s conduct will reveal the extent to which Polybius’ framework for the good general can be applied to Hannibal.  In Book III, the narrative includes the initiation of hostilities at Saguntum in Spain, to the move to and crossing of the Alps, to the first years of war in Italy, which included the battles at the River Trebia, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae .  Since the siege of Saguntum involved more interaction between Carthage and Rome than between Hannibal and any Roman general, it will not be discussed here.  Instead, the focus of this paper will rest on the Trebia and Sempronius Longus, Trasimene and Flaminius, and Cannae and Varro.

Before the Trebia, before the crossing of the Alps, Hannibal outmaneuvered the two Roman consuls sent to meet him in Gaul, P. Cornelius Scipio (senior) and Ti. Sempronius Longus [III.41.4-9].  The Roman armies were in bad form for having underestimated their adversary, but their initial plans had been astute.  They had planned to send the two consuls to Africa and force and engagement away from Italian soil [III.40.2], something that would eventually prove to be the only effective method of extracting Hannibal from the peninsula . 

In regards to Hannibal’s crossing of the ‘impassable’ Alps, Polybius condemns the ridiculous assumptions made by historians of his time that the Carthaginian army only survived by sheer luck instead of the prowess of their general. 

Can we imagine a more imprudent general or a more incompetent leader than Hannibal would have been if with so large an army under his command and all his hopes of ultimate success resting on it, he did not know the roads and the country, as these writers say, and had absolutely no idea where he was marching or against whom, or in fact if his enterprise were feasible or not? [III.48ff]

Many modern historians have doubted that the aims of the Carthaginian were realistic; Polybius did not.  He believed, from his own research, that Hannibal could very well have had every intention of doing as he suggested.  More importantly, however, Polybius recognized a responsibility in Hannibal to ensure the safety of his army for the success of his ambitions. 

This leads into the battle at the River Trebia between Hannibal and his army and the Roman army under the two consuls for 218 BCE.  After a thorough explication of Scipio’s considerations about the region around the river, Polybius relates that Hannibal was in contrast with Scipio in wishing for battle here.  “For when a general has brought his army into a foreign country and is engaged in such a risky enterprise, his only hope of safety lies in constantly keeping alive the hopes of his allies.  Such, then, was the purpose of Hannibal, who knew that Tiberius was sure to be aggressively inclined” [III.70.11-12].  How exactly he knew this is a matter of debate among modern historians, but the general consensus is that the Roman style of warfare was to look for decisive victories as quickly as possible . 

In this case, it appears Hannibal was correct.  His Numidian horsemen drew out the Roman army under Sempronius Longus and towards the battle ground chosen by Hannibal himself, “his wish being to get the enemy to fight him before they had breakfasted or made any preparations” [III.71.11].  Here again, modern historians observe that the Romans were more interested in careful deliberations before declaring war than they were of quick action , and that this had cost them dearly in being unable to intercept the Carthaginians before they reached Italy.  If this was true, then Hannibal could have believed that that same mentality would affect the temperament of the soldiers he was forcing into combat. 

It was this battle that led to a violent reaction by the Romans, one that Polybius understood as a dangerously unpredictable situation that would eventually turn against Hannibal.  “For the Romans both in public and in private are most to be feared when they stand in real danger” [III.75.8].  Naturally, this is a stance the Greek historian would take when one of his aims in the Histories was to show how Rome came to be rulers of the known world [I.1].  This cannot be used to show that Hannibal underestimated his adversary and struck a powerful blow without knowing that the retaliation would be enormous.  There had been no such situation before in Roman history, in politics or warfare or otherwise, that could have ever led Hannibal to believe that Rome would respond as she did.  Even the response was not as immediate as some scholars would wish to believe. 

One particular scholar who researched the magistrates elected during the Second Punic War revealed that, while army commanders were chosen primarily from those who had proven themselves effective generals, posts were only “filled by men who could be spared from the field of battle” .  Arguably, Rome was more than frequently facing a military situation and thus her magistrates were always elected under military circumstances, so this quote is redundant.  The election process continued on at the same pace it had before Hannibal’s invasion and it was only after the devastating battle of Cannae that the speed with which powerful commanders were put into the field increased .  So, even if Hannibal had considered the possibility of retaliation at such high political levels, it would have been a slow process, one that might not have time to come to fruition were the Carthaginians able to force the submission of Rome.  And yet, at this time “most of the men elevated to consulships had never before exercised independent command of an army.  They possessed no track-record to warrant that in an emergency they would prove equal to the challenge facing Rome” .  The Second Punic War still pitted amateur soldiers against experienced mercenaries.
The battle at Lake Trasimene was another incredible blow dealt to the Roman people.  This similarly vulnerable situation should have galvanized the Romans into action.  Instead, Hannibal was able to do precisely what he had been doing since he invaded Italy, and take reconnaissance of the area and details of the general he would face.  He learned that the marshes of Etruria would be the best place to surprise the enemy [III.78.6-8]. 

And, “on learning that… Flaminius was a thorough mod-courtier and demagogue, with no talent for the practical conduct of war and exceedingly self-confident withal, he calculated that if he passed by the Roman army and advanced into the country in his front, the Consul would on the one hand never look on while he laid it waste for fear of being jeered at by his soldiery; and on the other hand he would be so grieved that he would be ready to follow anywhere, in his anxiety to gain the coming victory for himself without waiting for the arrival of his colleague” [III.80.3-5]

“Ready to follow anywhere”, in the words of Paton translating Polybius, is precisely what the Roman commander did, sending his army along a narrow pass hemmed in by mountains on one side and the lake on the other.  They could thus only go forwards or, with difficulty, backwards. 

Admittedly, this is not a strong example of Hannibal understanding his enemy since the text was written by an historian who had the benefit of hindsight, and perhaps also a personal dislike for the general he was describing.  So let us examine the evidence for Flaminius’ actions from other sources and see if his character is clearer.

K.J. Mieklejohn believed that, in attempting to outflank Hannibal, Flaminius was himself flanked at Trasimene because he force-marched his troops to intercept the Carthaginians and did not adequately protect his vanguard .  When it came under attack and was stopped at the lake, it corked the forward motion of the rest of the Roman army and trapped it .  Marcia Patterson wrote that “Flaminius had already proved himself a successful and courageous leader”  but her explanatory footnote suggests only that he was an effective politician, not that he was a good military commander.  This is yet another example of the impetuosity of the Roman commanders for a decisive victory leading them into a dangerous situation.  They were of a mind that believed that politics and the military were indivisible when considering leadership qualities and this proved a substantial misjudgment . 

Finally, the infamous battle of Cannae represents the example of Hannibal’s good generalship shining through, knowing that his enemy would do what it had always done and act rashly.  On the alternating day allotted to the consul Varro, he takes the Romans out to engage in battle with Hannibal after days of being goaded by the Carthaginian but unable to act [III.113].  Aemilius Paullus has refused to put his army at risk and chooses instead to follow the tactics of Fabius Maximus ‘Cunctator’, the Delayer [III.112].  The emotional nature of Roman responses comes also at the end of this section, when Polybius describes the prayers and propitiations to the gods in Rome as they awaited the outcome of the inevitable battle.  “For in seasons of danger the Romans are given to propitiating both gods and men, and there is nothing at such times in rites of the kind that they regard as unbecoming or beneath their dignity” [III.112]. 

One of the weaknesses of the mid-Republican Roman army was its lack of reserve force; this is not a surprising omission since nowhere else in the Mediterranean world did citizen armies include reservists .  On the other hand, this tradition did not stop Hannibal from leaving his African troops in reserve and beginning the onslaught with Spanish and Celtic troops [III.113].  In addition, Hannibal had outfitted his troops with Roman arms, recognizing the value of such weapons as something the Romans themselves would have never had to face before [III.114].  The Romans went directly for the protruding centre of Hannibal’s line and were successfully pushing it back until they found themselves trapped with the African heavy infantry on their flanks [III.115].  Immediately they broke their formations that brought solidarity to the ranks, and began fighting almost as individuals in the melee of the battle [IIII.115].  They were annihilated where they stood.
Hannibal had, in a single brilliant stroke, taken advantage of the Roman commander’s desperation for battle and given Varro a target he would not question.  The Carthaginian strengthened his own infantry line with Roman weapons and more evenly matching the ability of his men to fight in close ranks, something the Romans had virtually monopolized previously .  He flanked the Roman army so completely that they were unable to maneuver and were functionally  wiped out.  “It seemed indeed as if Fortune were taking part against them in their struggle with adversity and meant to fill the cup to overflowing” [III.118.7].

The irony herein is that, just as Polybius described the characteristics of a bad general to implicitly allude to what makes a commander effective, so too did Hannibal reflect his own good nature in the impetuousness of his opponents.  Another irony is that despite being condemned at various points in the narrative for youthful ambition and impetuousness, it is the Romans that most clearly and consistently reflect such traits in their actions.

Polybius’ framework for the recognition of a good general puts the Romans in a very bad light but paints Hannibal as more than effective in his aims.  Why, when Polybius’ own aim was to describe the rise to power of the Roman people, would he choose to represent Hannibal as a better general than any of the consuls or dictators sent to face him?

B.D. Hoyos believes that Hannibal was an uncreative commander, whose imagination extended only to his initial route into Italy and did not go any further.  He argues with Gilbert Picard who believed Hannibal was “the perfect Hellenistic genius” , seeing more evidence for errors on the part of the Carthaginian .  It is worth noting that Hoyos does not refute the claim Picard makes that Hannibal was a Hellenistic leader.  The bulk of his support for this statement falls into a hole common among historians when he asks why Hannibal did not march on Rome after his victory at Cannae .  Hoyos writes:  “when the expected denouement to the grand invasion and victories failed to occur, his Italian strategy collapsed” .  And why does this surprise him?  Hannibal had just defeated one of the largest armies to be put in the field ever recorded [III.108].  If Hannibal were truly the Hellenistic commander Hoyos does not argue that he was, there is no reason to believe that the Carthaginian expected anything more than envoys begging for peace from Rome.  What a shock it must have been when they did not come; it is perhaps this moment of hesitation that Hoyos mistakes for banality. 

But as far as Polybius was concerned, Hannibal passed the test to be recognized as a good general.  This is supported on numerous occasions when Polybius does all that he can to defend the Carthaginian from the prejudices of contemporary history.

Arthur Eckstein presents a book reflecting the complexities of the character of Hannibal as presented to us by Polybius.  In one of the first excerpts from Book III of the Histories, Eckstein shows that Hannibal invoked all the major moral weaknesses that Polybius finds fault with.  Hannibal was young, passionate, spurned on by revenge and the memory of his father; he was full of anger and let his passions take precedent over his duty [III.15.6-11].  Polybius believes that if the Carthaginian had announced his ‘real’  intentions, of wanting the return of Corsica and Sardinia to Carthaginian control, the Second Punic War would never have begun [III.15.10].  What is interesting about this passage is that Eckstein juxtaposes it with another passage where Polybius wrote that he believed Hannibal could conduct a successful war [XI.10.6-7] . 

Polybius pardons Hannibal after his narration of the battle of Zama, naturally one might consider.  After all, the Romans have won, and what better way to honour the greatness of a victory than by praising the mighty enemy they have conquered.  “If he, who had never as yet suffered defeat, after taking every possible step to ensure victory, yet failed to do so, we must pardon him” .  However, this is not in any way a contrary or conciliatory statement made by Polybius.  Eckstein, citing Pedech’s Methode, rightly states that:  “what impresses Polybius here – as elsewhere – is the sheer quality of conduct” .

Another area of interest is Polybius’ focus on the need for a general to maintain his self-control [III.81.4-9], that the safety of one’s troops and one’s country should always be of paramount concern.  This is reconciled by Eckstein’s passage on Polybius’ belief in human greatness. 

The most explicit surviving remark on this human capacity for greatness is – interestingly enough – Polybius’ assessment of Hannibal at the height of the Second Punic War.  Here was one man in charge of the entire Punic War effort, managing not only his own personal campaign in Italy, but also bringing his will to bear with great force…simultaneously in Spain, Sicily, Greece, and Illyria as well…Polybius comments:  “Such a great and wonderful product of Nature is a man with a mind duly fitted by its original constitution for the undertaking of any project within human power” [IX.22.1-6]

There has been a great deal of discussion about why Polybius, his intentions pointing in a different direction methodologically, would laud Hannibal to such an extent as this.  Polybius was trying to show the statesmen of posterity the ways Rome rose to rule the world and thus, in a sense, to have them learn from the past.  Is he perhaps praising a worthy adversary?  Polybius met and interviewed Massinissa as the old African was nearing the end of his life and could have enjoyed stories of the man from Carthage who struck fear into the hearts of the Romans and for a very good reason.  They were facing a general who could have easily defeated them and who, on several occasions, came terrifyingly close to doing just that.  Is it possible that in Hannibal Polybius saw a man he could relate to? 

Hannibal was not the statesman Polybius was; that has already been established above.  But he was a soldier and a thinker, and that could have appealed to Polybius.  For the same reasons he defended Philopoemen and Aratus out of loyalty and a feeling that they had been unjustly treated by historians before him, Polybius treated Hannibal in a much more complimentary light than those historians.  To Polybius, historical truth was a kind of justice for those who did not speak for themselves. 
 
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